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of (and sometimes in conflict with) the priorities of the White House and U.S. State Department. In directing
monetary policy, the Fed’s primary concern is to benefit the U.S. economy. In the process, the Fed at times
acts in concert with foreign central banks, as was the case in setting new bank regulations after the 2008
financial crisis. At other times, the Fed acts in ways that other countries view as detrimental to their economic
interests. Either way, the Fed operates with little public accountability and can wind up complicating the work
of U.S. diplomats. This issue brief focuses on the questions of whether and how greater oversight of the Fed’s
international activities should be pursued. It recommends not an overhaul of the Fed’s structure or the
elimination of its role in international affairs but instead calls for greater disclosure of its international
activities. The Fed should provide testimony to Congress twice per year on its foreign policies, just as it does
for monetary and regulatory policy. This kind of disclosure permits broader discussion of the Fed’s activities
without eliminating the benefits of its institutional independence for monetary policy.
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Shining a Light on the Federal 
Reserve’s Foreign Affairs
Peter Conti-Brown, JD, PhD and David Zaring, JD
The Federal Reserve is more than the U.S. central bank; it is also a kind of 
financial State Department, playing a key role in the nation’s foreign affairs. 
This is not new: the Fed has functioned as a kind of diplomatic corps since its 
founding in 1913.  
Throughout this history, it has forged relationships, 
traditions, legal commitments, and even built formal 
organizational institutions with counterparties abroad. 
While important to the Fed’s identity, these connec-
tions are also not unique in government. Most inde-
pendent regulatory agencies engage in some kind of 
international diplomacy, separate from the U.S. State 
Department.1 We call this practice of pursuing foreign 
affairs outside the usual channels of Congress and the 
State Department “regulatory diplomacy.”2 
Pursuing policy of any kind—social or economic, 
foreign or domestic—outside the direct control of 
the people’s representatives in the White House and 
Congress strikes some as evidence of a “deep state” 
bent on undermining popular will.3 We disagree, and 
see the complexity of our nation’s institutions not as 
an invitation for conspiracy theorists but an invitation 
to reflect on the appropriate balance between techno-
cratic policymaking and democratic accountability. In 
this Issue Brief, we focus solely on the Federal Reserve, 
with its extraordinary power to disrupt foreign econo-
mies, respond to cross-border financial contagion, and 
favor or disfavor allies with financial interventions in 
SUMMARY
• Throughout its history, the U.S. Federal Reserve has engaged in 
international diplomacy, outside the bounds of (and sometimes 
in conflict with) the priorities of the White House and U.S. State 
Department.
• In directing monetary policy, the Fed’s primary concern is to benefit 
the U.S. economy. In the process, the Fed at times acts in concert 
with foreign central banks, as was the case in setting new bank 
regulations after the 2008 financial crisis. At other times, the Fed acts 
in ways that other countries view as detrimental to their economic 
interests. Either way, the Fed operates with little public account-
ability, and can wind up complicating the work of U.S. diplomats.
• This issue brief focuses on the questions of whether and how 
greater oversight of the Fed’s international activities should be 
pursued. It recommends not an overhaul of the Fed’s structure or 
the elimination of its role in international affairs, but instead calls 
for greater disclosure of its international activities.
• The Fed should provide testimony to Congress twice per year on 
its foreign policies, just as it does for monetary and regulatory 
policy. This kind of disclosure permits broader discussion of the 
Fed’s activities without eliminating the benefits of its institutional 
independence for monetary policy.
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their countries. If these functions were 
placed inside an institution with more 
direct public accountability—such as 
the State Department—there would 
be less cause for concern. But the idea 
that the Fed might have an indepen-
dent diplomatic policy poses a threat 
to “the traditionally executive role in 
foreign policy,” given the Fed’s unique 
independence as a government agency. 
The Fed has longer traditions of inde-
pendence, controls its own funding 
to an extent unmatched elsewhere in 
the administrative state, and is almost 
completely sealed off from judicial 
review.4,5,6 These institutional bar-
riers against oversight by the execu-
tive, Congress, and the judiciary give 
added urgency to the need for more 
oversight over the Fed’s “regulatory 
diplomacy.”
Such oversight, however, can 
go too far. It may be impossible to 
demand central bank subservience in 
diplomacy while preserving central 
bank independence for monetary 
policy, especially as the trends toward 
globally integrated monetary and 
financial systems increase. Adding 
oversight to the Fed’s diplomatic role 
may undermine the Fed’s efficacy as 
a monetary policymaker.  The task for 
democratic accountability of tech-
nocratic institutions is therefore a 
delicate balancing act. 
We recommend, then, not an 
overhaul of the Fed’s structure or the 
elimination of its role in international 
affairs, but the more surgical mandate 
of greater disclosure of its inter-
national activities. The Fed should 
provide testimony to Congress twice 
per year on its foreign policies, just as 
it does for monetary and regulatory 
policy.  This kind of disclosure permits 
broader discussion of the Fed’s activi-
ties without eliminating the benefits 
of its institutional independence for 
monetary policy.7 
Lest this seem like modest reform, 
the Fed has fiercely fought even 
this level of formalized oversight in 
other contexts.8  We therefore take a 
moderate position against both the 
Fed’s historical positions, which would 
exempt most kinds of disclosures of 
its diplomacy, and the more searching 
congressional interventions that have 
been mooted in proposed legisla-
tion, such as requiring congressional 
pre-approval of the Fed’s regulatory 
diplomacy, or prohibiting the central 
bank from participating in the forums 
where it concludes its international 
arrangements without going through 
notice and comment rulemaking 
before doing so.9 
THE FED’S AGENDA IS ALL 
ITS OWN
Almost throughout its history, the 
Fed has taken domestic factors—not 
international ones—into primary 
account when conducting monetary 
policy. The tendency to allow domestic 
interests to direct monetary policy and 
indirectly shape the Fed’s interactions 
with foreign counterparts runs deep, 
back to its founding, where it was 
created not only to mimic the Bank 
of England, but also to beat it at its 
own game of housing the interna-
tional reserve currency for global trade 
and finance. The idea of becoming 
an international playmaker for U.S. 
interests thus was baked into the Fed’s 
institutional DNA.10
This domestic focus becomes a 
source of grave frustration both of 
central bankers elsewhere, who would 
like the Fed to take a more global 
perspective, and other U.S. diplomats, 
whose jobs become more difficult 
when domestic economic interests 
spill over into foreign policy. 
Take, for instance, the successive 
rounds of quantitative easing, intro-
duced in late 2008 in response to the 
2008 financial crisis and consequent 
recession. Through a series of policy 
moves, the Fed began a long-term 
1  Today, 13 of the 18 agencies designated as independent by 
Congress have international affairs offices.
2  This Issue Brief is based on Peter Conti-Brown and David 
Zaring, “The Foreign Affairs of the Federal Reserve,” Work-
ing Paper.
3  On the “deep state” as a fundamentally anti-democratic 
institutionalized bureaucracy, see Mark Tushnet, “Introduc-
tion: Reflections on the First Amendment and the Informa-
tion Economy,” 127 HARV. L. REV. 2234, 2246 (2014). 
4  David Zaring, “Financial Reform’s Internationalism,” 65 
EMORY L.J. 1256, 1302 (2016).
5  For more discussion of the Fed’s budgetary autonomy, see 
Peter Conti-Brown, “The Institutions of Federal Reserve 
Independence,” 32 YALE J. REG. 257, 273-285 (2015).
6  In Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank, 34 F.2d 910, 915 (2d 
Cir. 1929), the court concluded that “the correction of 
discount rates by judicial decree seems almost grotesque.” 
The Fed has enjoyed very limited judicial review for most 
of its activities ever since. See David Zaring, “Law and 
Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee,” 78 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 158 (2015).
7  See 12 U.S.C. § 225b (setting forth the semi-annual re-
quirement of congressional testimony).
8  We mean “Audit the Fed” and rules-based monetary policy, 
although each in its way departs from a pure disclosure by 
testimony approach that we advocate here. For more, see 
Peter Conti-Brown, The Power and Independence of the 
Federal Reserve (2016).
9  These proposals have been included in the Financial 
Choice Act, which has passed the House. The statute 
would, among other things, “[c]reate greater transparency 
for financial regulators by requiring them to release for no-
tice and comment a public disclosure of any positions they 
NOTES
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set of experiments to combat high 
unemployment and the potential 
devastation of deflation. International 
critics—in China, Brazil, India, and 
elsewhere—claimed that the Fed was 
engaged in “currency wars,” since these 
unconventional policies had the con-
sequence of depreciating the U.S. dol-
lar at the expense of export-oriented 
economies.11  Former Fed Chair-
man Ben Bernanke denied that the 
intent was to harm emerging-market 
countries, but he also disclaimed any 
responsibility for considering the eco-
nomic interests of allies.12  “Financial 
regulation and supervision are areas in 
which the Fed and other central banks 
should cooperate (and to an important 
extent already do) to reduce finan-
cial risks,” he said. But on monetary 
policy the response was different. As 
“economic conditions in our respec-
tive countries” differed, Bernanke 
noted, “our perceived interests began 
to diverge.”
As Bernanke noted above, the Fed 
has at times acted in a more “cosmo-
politan” fashion, with a commitment 
to international cooperation, especially 
in the areas of bank regulation—
which it oversees in conjunction with 
several foreign central banks—and 
ensuring global financial stability. 
What is remarkable is how much the 
Fed controls its foreign policy agenda, 
whether it is seeking U.S. domestic 
economic priorities or seeking inter-
national cooperation.
FINANCIAL STABILITY ABROAD
During the Mexican peso crisis 
in the mid-1990s, called by some 
the “first crisis of the 21st century,” 
many feared that Mexico’s default on 
its government debt would not only 
wreak havoc on its own economy, but 
also affect its major trading partners—
including the United States. The 
Clinton Administration wanted to 
help Mexico avoid default, and needed 
$40 billion to rescue the peso, but the 
Administration feared congressional 
backlash to using funds Congress 
had authorized for arguably different 
contexts. The Fed then intervened. 
Specifically, the Fed’s Division of 
International Finance engineered a 
way for Mexico to exchange pesos 
for dollars through an “international 
swap facility” between the Fed and 
the Bank of Mexico.13 Through the 
swap facility, Mexico could get access 
to dollars exclusively from the Federal 
Reserve that it could not secure in the 
private markets.
The peso intervention provided a 
blueprint for the Fed’s actions dur-
ing the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Although the Fed is most remem-
bered for its “bailouts” of U.S.-based 
banks and other financial institutions, 
the Fed also stretched its legal author-
ity to provide favored foreign central 
banks with the dollar liquidity they 
needed to survive. As one scholar 
observed, “at the height of the finan-
cial crisis, the biggest beneficiaries of 
the Federal Reserve’s emergency loans 
were not American banks but Euro-
pean ones.”14 The so-called Eurodol-
lar market was also, during the crisis, 
faced with a high demand and a small 
supply for U.S. dollars, putting all 
financial institutions participating in 
Eurodollar trades—and there were 
many of them—at risk.
In 2008-2010, the Fed became 
the world’s banker by supplying U.S. 
dollars in exchange for currencies 
from over a dozen countries, reflect-
ing the Fed’s belief that crisis response 
required internationalism. These trans-
actions are known as currency swaps, 
and agreements in place to commit 
to a number of currency swaps in 
advance are called swap lines.15 Swap 
lines both exemplify the Fed’s power, 
given the size and importance of these 
swaps, and the Fed’s autonomy in 
deploying that power. Although Con-
gress has never formally enshrined 
these swaps into the language of the 
plan to take as part of international regulatory negotiations, 
and provide a public report to Congress on the negotia-
tions at their conclusion.” Staff of H. Comm. on Financial 
Services, 114th Cong. Memo on the full committee markup 
of the Financial Choice Act of 2016.
10 Congress’s instructions to the Fed do not mention an inter-
national mission, though the setting of American monetary 
policy has global implications. 12 U.S.C. § 225a (instruct-
ing the Fed to set rates “to increase production, so as to 
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”). An 
exception to this domestic-first approach was the Fed’s 
sometimes unthinking devotion to the gold standard in 
the interwar era, where the Fed’s interest-rate decisions 
seemed more tailored to protecting the UK’s ability to sus-
tain the international gold standard than it did to protecting 
domestic U.S. economic interests. 
11 James Rickards, Currency Wars: The Making of the Next 
Global Crisis (2012). 
12 Bernanke pointed to the empirical evidence suggesting 
that such devaluation is offset by the increase in domestic 
income, “which in turn raises home demand for foreign 
goods and services.” Ben S. Bernanke, Brookings Institu-
tion, Mundell-Fleming Lecture at the IMF: Federal Reserve 
Policy in an International Context (Dec. 2015).
13 See Edwin Truman, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications 
for International Finance, https://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/bulletin/1996/396lead.pdf.
14 For an overview, see Stephen A. Fowler, Note, “The Mon-
etary Fifth Column: The Eurodollar Threat to Financial Sta-
bility and Economic Sovereignty,” 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 825, 827 (2014).
15 These swaps are not permanent. Part of the agreement is 
NOTES 
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Federal Reserve Act, today the swap 
lines between the Fed and six for-
eign central banks have become fully 
formalized. 
It is worth underscoring how 
selective the Fed was, even among 
the U.S.’s diplomatic allies. The Fed 
entered swaps with Brazil but not 
Argentina, Japan but not China, and 
Singapore but not Malaysia. This 
kind of selective policy was no doubt 
motivated in large part by the Fed’s 
assessment of counterparty risk and 
where dollar liquidity would do the 
most good. But the appearance (and 
likely substance) of the decision also 
reflects the irreducibly political and 
diplomatic nature of the Fed’s foreign 
relations. Normally, the President, 
subject to parameters established in 
law by Congress, is in charge of deter-
mining which allies get which bene-
fits, whether in trade, military support, 
direct aid, or other kinds of benefits. 
Here, supporting U.S. allies’ financial 
systems—hardly a niche interest from 
the perspective of foreign relations—
was left to the Fed alone to determine. 
It was not only the fact of these 
alliances that draws interesting atten-
tion, but the size as well. At one point 
the Fed had swapped currencies worth 
$583 billion, or one-fourth of the 
assets on its books, to its foreign part-
ners.”16 By way of contrast, the entire 
foreign development assistance budget 
for USAID in 2017 was $22 billion.17
INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISION 
AND REGULATION
After World War I, central banks 
seeking financial cooperation orga-
nized what they called the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), 
located in neutral Switzerland, as a 
kind of bank for central banks, a pri-
vate organization with a public pur-
pose owned by the central banks and 
not their governments.18 Although 
the BIS lurched through a controver-
sial turn during World War II—the 
BIS probably laundered gold stolen 
by Nazis from the regime’s Jewish 
victims—the BIS continued to find its 
footing as a support institution even 
after the establishment of the World 
Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, sister organizations with over-
lapping responsibilities. Eventually, 
prompted by two medium-sized, but 
broadly consequential, international 
bank failures in 1974, the Fed, the 
other central bank governors of the 
G-10, Luxembourg, and Switzerland 
established the Basel Committee on 
Bank Supervision. This committee 
asserted that central banks could best 
perform the regulatory parts of their 
jobs in concert. To this day, the BIS 
acts as the committee’s secretariat.19 
As with the BIS, the Fed cre-
ated Basel without congressional 
authorization to do so (though that 
eventually came later.)20  There is little 
evidence that in its secretive early 
years the executive branch had much 
information at all about the policy 
formulation process in Basel. The U.S. 
Treasury Secretary still has not had an 
opportunity to join the committee or 
to participate in its meetings. It was 
strictly a central bank affair.21 
Bank supervision is not now and 
has almost never been the exclusive 
purview of central banks, whether in 
the United States or abroad.22  But 
through the Basel Committee, central 
banks negotiated an international 
regulatory framework of enormous, 
decisive importance to the way that 
national governments think about this 
basic feature of government-market 
interactions.23  Participation in these 
international efforts to coordinate 
bank supervision also exemplify the 
Fed at its most cosmopolitan, as it 
has agreed to conduct the rules it 
uses to supervise the most impor-
tant American banks, including their 
capital rules, in the manner set by an 
international process that it influences, 
but does not control. There are few 
the foreign central bank’s commitment to repurchase its 
currency at a set future date for a set price, which means 
that it receives back the exact nominal amount of dollars 
that it originally swapped. The foreign central bank also 
pays an additional fee based on a preset interest rate.
16  See Colleen Baker, “The Federal Reserve’s Use of Interna-
tional Swap Lines,” 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 603, 607 (2013).
17 McKenna, Long & Aldridge, “History and Mission of USAID,” 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW § 4:2 
(Aug. 2017).
18 See Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Bank for International 
Settlements: A Profile of an International Organization 2 
(June 1995) (describing the BIS ownership structure).
19 The Basel Committee itself does not have a staff, and barely 
has a budget. It is, at best, a kind of institutionalized meet-
ing that makes ample use of the resources of the home 
central banks and the coordination function of the BIS.
20  International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U.S.C. § 
3901(b).
21 The Fed has since been joined by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
22 See Elizabeth F. Brown, “Consolidated Financial Regulation: 
Six National Case Studies and the Experience of the Euro-
pean Union,” Volcker Alliance Working Paper.
23 Why Basel became so important has been the subject of 
much debate. For an overview, see Pierre-Hugues Verdier, 
“The Political Economy of International Financial Regula-
tion,” 88 IND. L.J. 1405, 1422 (2013).
24 Victoria McGrane & Ryan Tracy, “Sen. Shelby to Unveil Leg-
islation Heightening Fed Security,” Wall Street Journal (May 
11, 2015).
25 Huw Jones, “Fed’s Quarles to chair Financial Stability 
NOTES
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regulatory questions of more interest 
to banks than how much capital they 
must maintain, and the Fed’s deci-
sion to delegate the answer to that 
question to an international process 
reflects a foreign policy decision as 
much as a financial regulatory one.
Basel’s requirements have been 
blamed in some quarters as a con-
tributor to the 2008 financial crisis, 
particularly because of its overly 
generous treatment of the stability of 
housing assets, but the Fed has made 
this framework the focus of its crisis 
response, even empowering a new and 
more politically responsive overseer 
for the committee, the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB). The FSB 
comprises all of the principal financial 
regulatory networks, chiefly the Basel 
Committee, along with the securities 
market and insurance company regu-
lators, the World Bank, and the IMF.
Participation in these international 
forums are not unanimously popular 
among U.S. politicians, in part because 
of a sense in some corners that these 
bodies impose international coopera-
tion at the expense of U.S. domestic 
interests. In the interest of making 
sure that the U.S. can see after its own 
economic needs first, members of both 
the House and Senate have intro-
duced legislation that would forbid 
American financial regulators from 
setting regulatory standards through 
an international process.24  Despite 
this, the Fed has continued to rely on 
Basel and the FSB to set the stan-
dards for safety and soundness that 
it applies to American banks.  This 
reality was reinforced with the recent 
appointment of Fed Governor Randal 
Quarles—the Fed’s first ever Vice 
Chair for Supervision appointed by 
President Trump in 2017—as the new 
chair of the FSB.25 Post-crisis finan-
cial regulation thus has continued 
to be outsourced to an international 
process.
REFORMING THE FED’S 
REGULATORY DIPLOMACY
What to do about this unusual, 
even unique, set of institutional 
arrangements at the intersection of 
central banking and foreign affairs? 
Opening the Federal Reserve Act for 
a complete overhaul, as some have 
proposed in response to perceived 
abuses of authority, is unappeal-
ing.26  There is no guarantee that the 
resulting central bank would be an 
improvement to the existing one, and 
a great risk that it would be inferior. 
If its independence is one of the Fed’s 
most valuable, if frequently misunder-
stood, political assets, it is difficult to 
find ways to obligate it to coordinate 
its foreign relations policies with 
the legislature or executive without 
damaging that asset with respect 
to monetary policy. Reforming the 
Fed—to improve its accountability in 
foreign affairs or in any other aspect of 
its institutional design—confronts this 
same challenge: how to protect what 
is worthwhile about the Fed as an 
independent central bank while also 
increasing the extent of democratic 
accountability that its other activities 
require. 
Three proposals with historical 
precedent can be dismissed outright:
1. Making the Fed’s chief diplo-
mat a Senate-confirmed Presidential 
appointee (removable at the Presi-
dent’s will);
2. Increasing the formal, insti-
tutionalized congressional oversight 
of the Fed, through the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO); and
3. Doing nothing.
The first proposal would destroy 
the Fed’s independence; there is 
nothing inherent in the second that 
NOTES 
Board,” Reuters, November 26, 2018.
26 Thomas F. Cargill. “The Myth of Central Bank Indepen-
dence, Mercatus Working Paper,” Mercatus Center at 
George Mason University, Arlington, VA, October 2016.
27 § Section 211 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, 
and Consumer Protection Act directs the Fed Chairman 
and the Treasury Secretary, or their designees, to report 
to Congress on the efforts of both entities to increase 
transparency at meetings of the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).
28 In fact, there may be occasion for a Congressional Hear-
ings On Regulatory Diplomacy Act (the “CHORD Act”) that 
would institutionalize regular testimony for all agencies 
engaged in regulatory diplomacy.
29 Board of Governors, Financial Stability Report, November 
28, 2018, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/financial-stability-report.htm.
30 Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Supervision and 
Regulation Report, November 9, 2018, available at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/supervision-and-
regulation-report.htm.
31 Jerome H. Powell, “The Federal Reserve’s Framework 
for Monitoring Financial Stability,” Speech at The Eco-
nomic Club of New York, November 28, 2018, available 
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
powell20181128a.htm.
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suggests GAO-oversight would lead 
to better policy outcomes; and the 
third is unappealing on its face. Not 
only is the general lack of account-
ability troubling, but also the consis-
tency of the Fed’s approach to foreign 
relations is, as we have shown, by no 
means clear. And while a consistent 
foreign policy is not a be-all and 
end-all, the Fed might serve its own 
interests as well as the public interest 
if it provided more information about 
its international plans than it does 
today. Also, in a time of concern about 
the deep state, doing nothing about 
the Fed’s increasingly controversial 
regulatory diplomacy risks furthering 
a political backlash against any degree 
of agency discretion. These decisions 
are inescapably political. Regulatory 
diplomacy, with all of its virtues, needs 
some kind of external political check 
to guide its internal political logic.
For this reason, we endorse a 
fourth proposal to address the prob-
lem of the Fed’s independent foreign 
relations policy: a modest legislative 
fix whereby the Fed goes to Congress 
twice annually, separate from its twice 
annual monetary policy testimony, 
to discuss specifically its vision of 
international affairs and the Fed’s role 
within it. The scope of these hearings 
would go beyond the new reporting 
requirements mandated by the May 
2018 bipartisan banking law.27 For 
the most part, these hearings would 
be uneventful, even boring. But these 
hearings can serve a useful purpose for 
democratic accountability by educat-
ing members of Congress—and the 
public—about exactly how inter-
national an institution the Federal 
Reserve actually is. And if, as in 
today’s climate, the Fed’s internation-
alism is out-of-step with the political 
zeitgeist, a bit of democratic humility 
might counsel toward an adjustment 
in orientation. 
In this way, the Fed’s foreign rela-
tions would be subject to enhanced 
disclosure, but not other more intru-
sive forms of legislative action (such as 
political audits). It would be a publi-
cally beneficial exercise for the Fed to 
clarify where it sees its international 
relationships. It also would give the 
executive and legislative branches 
an opportunity to adjust their own 
thinking about international economic 
affairs. More testimony and hearings 
amount to low-key reform, but in this 
case the more exciting solutions seem 
to come with uniquely detrimental 
drawbacks. Our disclosure-oriented 
approach could, more generally, 
inform the way the political branches 
treat the other independent agen-
cies.28 
The Fed will likely resist such a 
proposal, but its recent forays into 
greater transparency have nevertheless 
been encouraging. In November 2018, 
the Fed released the first installments 
of two new reports that it intends to 
publish regularly: the Financial Sta-
bility Report29  and the Supervision 
and Regulation Report.30 Current Fed 
Chairman Jerome Powell referred to 
these documents as “important tools” 
for “sharing Federal Reserve views and 
stimulating public dialogue regarding 
the stability of the financial system.”31 
On the subject of the Fed’s foreign 
relations, it would be beneficial to the 
public for the Fed to continue this 
trend toward transparency—with or 
without a nudge from Congress.
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